Continua: Banqueiros pediram a Maria Luís que injetasse dinheiro da troika no BES. Ministra disse que não

* também conhecido por “sacudir água do pacote” (diria mesmo aos pacotes).

(E mais uma nota da redacção deste blogue: Ministra disse que não, mas injectou.)


“Free-market economists tend to dismiss the value of longevity. Joseph Schumpeter’s term “creative destruction” has become shorthand for a messy but effective way of delivering valuable innovations and progress. No rational person in a free society, these economists say, would want to frustrate innovations that render existing products and companies obsolete but bring prosperity and benefits to the broader population. They add that no rational person in a free society would want to prevent new managers or owners from using existing assets more productively.

Up to a point, I support that argument. But it needs to be examined and challenged constantly if the underlying idea is not to be abused. Not all destruction is creative, and not all creativity is destructive. The demise of a company is not damaging only for its stakeholders. Sometimes, it may also be an inefficient way of innovating in the economy or an industry, because it breaks up established and tangible assets, such as R&D know-how and strong consumer and supplier relationships. A company that learns to adapt and change to meet market demands avoids not just the trauma of decline or an unwanted change of ownership but also very real transaction and disruption costs.

Corporate endurance should not be an end in itself. That said, in a very real sense, survival is the ultimate performance measure.”


“The stress tests have paved the way for the European Central Bank to assume full authority over the Continent’s banks. Like the Federal Reserve in the United States, it may choose to gradually stiffen the tests to increase the chances that they appear credible. One way to do that would be to determine whether the banks could meet a clearer measure of their capital called the leverage ratio. This yardstick, which is less vulnerable to manipulation, is included in American tests.

But applying the leverage ratio may reveal a yawning hole at European banks, according to an analysis by Sascha Steffen, an associate professor at ESMT European School of Management and Technology in Berlin, and Viral V. Acharya, a professor of economics at New York University. They first assumed European banks had to write off all the nonperforming loans that are not covered by reserves. Then they calculated how much equity capital the banks would then need so that their equity capital equaled 4 percent of total assets. In that situation, the banks in the sample would have a theoretical capital shortfall of nearly $350 billion.”



Não há qualquer coisa de errado neste título: “Lloyds sobe lucros em 41% e prepara rescisões para nove mil“?




O ar excessivamente sereno com que comentadores e jornalistas económicos se referiram ao resultado BCP tem, a meu ver, o efeito exactamente contrário ao pretendido como as oscilações bolsistas bem demonstram.

O argumento, para serenar os ânimos relativamente ao BCP, de que estes testes reportam à posição de 2013, é frágil e reversível. Os resultados não podem ser bons para uma coisa e maus para outra.

Penso que vale também a pena olhar com atenção para os resultados da CGD, nada animadores para quem pretende que este banco seja o motor das PME.

Sobre a relevância, importância e fiabilidade destes testes, o tempo nos deixará ver melhor, como sempre.

Como sabemos, a história gosta de ser original e crises de dívida soberana (a hipotética situação stressante em que os testes se baseiam) não acontecem todos os 3 anos, como sublinha o comunicado da CGD:  “As projeções do Stress-test, incluindo as associadas ao cenário de base, não podem ser consideradas previsões do desempenho do banco uma vez que têm subjacente restrições pré-determinadas e, no caso do cenário adverso, têm por base hipóteses plausíveis mas extremas e, como tal, com baixa probabilidade de se verificarem.”

Quanto à fiabilidade destes testes, em geral, penso que o caso BES foi um golpe difícil de sarar.

Acabo com as palavras do próprio BCE, que referem o facto principal a reter deste exercício e que, para Portugal, significa a perda de controle sobre, entre outros, a CGD :  “Este exercício rigoroso constitui um marco para a entrada em funcionamento do Mecanismo Único de Supervisão em Novembro.”

“Co-op Bank’s governance structure up to the middle of 2013 was entirely inadequate for a bank of any size; it is shocking that it was in place in an institution that came so close to becoming a major new challenger bank. Co-op Bank’s board was dominated by members from the parent group who lacked financial services experience. Those members with financial services experience were responsible for overseeing a very broad range of business. Being small in number, their expertise was spread too thinly, and ran the risk of being over-ruled by possibly well-meaning, but inexperienced, democratic members of the board. Yet, at least from 2009 to 2011, the board was also too large and unwieldy to allow for meaningful discussion and debate. The executive was also subject to influence from Co-op Group, with the bank’s Chief Executive in a direct reporting line to the group’s Chief Executive from 2011. (paragraph 203)

The deficient composition of Co-op Bank’s governance was embodied in Paul Flowers, who lacked any of the requisite financial services experience to act as Chairman of a bank. In this regard he appointed two experienced Deputy Chairmen to strengthen the advice to him and the board. Mr Flowers was appointed on the basis that he would be able to navigate the ‘politics’ of Co-op Group and chair the board. We took evidence that he had performed these functions well. But this was an inappropriate basis for his appointment. An effective bank Chairman should usually possess a good deal of experience of financial services. He or she should be at least capable of understanding financial issues. Mr Flowers lacked both the desirable experience and the minimum essential skills. He should not have put himself forward for the role. Co-op should not have selected him. The regulator should not have permitted his appointment.”

Excerto de um relatório de uma “comissão parlamentar” inglesa, que também pode servir de exemplo sobre o funcionamento de comissões parlamentares de inquérito.

“(…) para evitar que a instituição fique exposta aos riscos reputacionais que podem resultar do confronto de ideias que decorre nas eleições (…)”


em defesa do tribunal constitucional

Esta foi a minha leitura de fim de semana. E não dei o tempo por perdido. Das primeiras páginas que quase se podem considerar aulas de direito constitucional “for dummies” (vou dar a ler ao meu filho, agora a braços com o curso de Direito, coitado), às últimas que dão, acima de tudo, sentido e valor ao exercício da cidadania, é um livro cuja leitura recomendo. Trata-se de uma  análise séria e honesta dos argumentos dos que criticam o Tribunal Constitucional por este ter decretado a inconstitucionalidade de algumas leis, que penso permitir até aos que não concordam com o autor, formar ou reforçar a sua opinião sobre o Estado de Direito e a Democracia, paradoxalmente conceitos pouco claros para tantos nestes dias. 


“In particular, in common with other jurisdictions, the UK regime did not have a bail-in tool, which ensures that the owners and unsecured creditors of the failing firm bear the losses associated with failure, even where the authorities are not in a position to break up the firm over a weekend or place it into an insolvency proceeding. But later enhancements to the UK regime, alongside changes that are being introduced through implementation of the European Union’s Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive from 1 January 2015, will bring the UK regime into line with the FSB’s international standard for banks and investment firms.

Having the right set of powers is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for orderly resolution. Firms also need to be organised in such a way that the powers can be used without significant adverse consequences for the rest of the financial system and the wider economy, and without bailouts by the taxpayer. In other words, firms that fall within scope of the UK regime need to be resolvable.

Hence firms need to be structured in a way that facilitates resolution, avoiding complex legal or operational structures.

Resolvability also requires the largest firms to have enough loss-absorbing capacity available — in the right places — when the firm fails, so that a bail-in can be conducted. Formedium-sized firms, there needs to be some capacity to absorb losses, so that the authorities can choose the best method to resolve the firm while maintaining continuity of its activities. And for the smallest firms, it must be possible to transfer, pay out or return protected deposits and/or client assets promptly and smoothly.”

Daqui, podemos ver que pelo menos em “resolução” de bancos somos muito melhores e estamos muito mais à frente do que os ingleses. Resolvemos tudo num fim de semana e à primeira. 

fundos de resolucao

Artigo do Wall Street Journal de 22 de Outubro.


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