Aqui, o leitor pode escolher se quer a banha da cobra insurgente ou a banha da cobra livre. Ou então, lê os comentários e percebe do que se fala.
Clicando na imagem da Borsa Italiana, acede-se ao Código.
“As additional services are typically paid for directly by senior management, the main objective of the additional disclosure rules is to ensure the independence of the compensation consultants hired by the compensation committee. However, we find that the consultant industry, especially those multi-service providers most threatened by the new disclosure rules, reacted quickly to this mandate. The largest multi-service providers such as Hewitt Associates, Mercer Partners, and Towers Watson spun off “independent” consulting businesses solely focused on executive compensation with former senior partners at the helm. The market share of specialist consultants jumped from 47% to 62% in 2010 and continues to rise to 79% in 2012. After the rule change, client firms that switched to specialist consultants paid their chief executive officers (CEOs) 9.7% more in median total compensation than a matched sample of firms that remained with multi-service consultants. We also find that, after the rule change, senior management is more likely to hire their own compensation consultant to work alongside one or more board-retained consultants. Compensation consultants retained solely by the board are associated with 12.9% lower median pay levels than a matched sample of firms with additional management-retained consultants.”
“Following the banking crash the regulatory deckchairs were rearranged; but little has changed. Despite their failures, regulators continue to rely on credit rating agencies and accountancy firms.
This reliance on external advisers means that the regulators have failed to develop an adequate in-house knowledge base and are in a poor position to manage the risks of bank behaviour. Let’s hope it doesn’t take another crash of the financial market to encourage the IMF and the regulators to reflect on institutional failures in the banking system that is at the heart of the global economy.”
Prem Sikka, dizendo o óbvio, (há que dizê-lo as vezes que forem precisas) aqui, sugerido pelo Filipe Morais.
“The E.C.B.’s new powers will allow it to intervene in bank management in ways it could not during the Cyprus crisis. The E.C.B. would be able to block a bank from paying dividends to shareholders and use the money to build up capital. A new central authority, which will start taking effect next year, will also provide a less disruptive process for winding down banks and selling off assets.
“What is different this time is that we are much better equipped,” Ms. Nouy said. “When there are crises, we will be able to organize the closure of a bank in an orderly fashion without creating domino effects.”
“I’m sure that all those measures are making the financial sector safer,” Ms. Nouy said. “But,” she added, “I am not promising that there will not be banking crises anymore.”
(comparar com isto)
“The objective of an effective resolution regime is to make feasible the resolution of financial institutions without severe systemic disruption and without exposing taxpayers to loss, while protecting vital economic functions through mechanisms which make it possible for shareholders and unsecured and uninsured creditors to absorb losses in a manner that respects the hierarchy of claims in liquidation.
An effective resolution regime (interacting with applicable schemes and arrangements for the protection of depositors, insurance policy holders and retail investors) should:
(i) ensure continuity of systemically important financial services, and payment, clearing and settlement functions;
(ii) protect, where applicable and in coordination with the relevant insurance schemes and arrangements such depositors, insurance policy holders and investors as are covered by such schemes and arrangements, and ensure the rapid return of segregated client assets;
(iii) allocate losses to firm owners (shareholders) and unsecured and uninsured creditors in a manner that respects the hierarchy of claims;
(iv) not rely on public solvency support and not create an expectation that such support will be available;
(v) avoid unnecessary destruction of value, and therefore seek to minimise the overall costs of resolution in home and host jurisdictions and, where consistent with the other objectives, losses for creditors;
(vi) provide for speed and transparency and as much predictability as possible through legal and procedural clarity and advanced planning for orderly resolution;
(vii) provide a mandate in law for cooperation, information exchange and coordination domestically and with relevant foreign resolution authorities before and during a resolution;
(viii) ensure that non-viable firms can exit the market in an orderly way; and
(ix) be credible, and thereby enhance market discipline and provide incentives for market-based solutions.”
Clicando na imagem pode ler-se o documento na íntegra.